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of  Official Export 
Credit Programs 
Heywood Fleisig and Catharine Hill 
9.1  Introduction 
Governments support export credits in, broadly, two ways: through 
direct loan and subsidy programs and through insurance and guarantee 
programs. Under direct loan programs, government institutions extend 
export credits directly, often in association with private financing. Under 
subsidy programs, governments operate indirectly on export credits by 
extending preferential refinancing and interest subsidies to private lend- 
ers. In the United States, Canada, and Japan, official export institutions 
lend directly to both domestic exporters and foreign importers at fixed 
subsidized rates. In Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, 
official institutions combine direct lending, refinancing of private export 
credits at preferential rates, and interest rate subsidies to achieve similar 
results .' 
The subsidy in officially supported export credits arises in several ways: 
loans are made at fixed rates to borrowers who would normally qualify 
only for variable rate loans, at maturities generally longer than available 
in the private market for comparable loans to such borrowers, and at 
lower rates than these borrowers would otherwise pay. Governments also 
subsidize exports through loan insurance and guarantee programs when 
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they  sell insurance  and guarantees at prices below their true market 
value. 
When a government guarantees or insures a loan made to finance an 
export, it creates a financial instrument against which the lending institu- 
tion,  either a bank  or an exporter, can borrow  at rates close to the 
government borrowing rate. The potential profit on a guaranteed  or 
insured loan to the lender equals the rate at which the importer could 
have borrowed in the private market without insurance or a guarantee, 
and the rate at which the lender can borrow against the guaranteed loan, 
minus any insurance or guarantee fees. 
All of  the countries considered have institutions that extend export 
credit insurance or guarantees. Through these institutions the govern- 
ment assumes a large proportion of  the credit risk on loans to foreign 
buyers. Although the subsidy element on an insured or guaranteed loan is 
generally smaller than on a directly supported export credit, there are 
about three times more insured or guaranteed export credits outstanding 
than direct loans. Therefore, the total subsidy on such programs may still 
be substantial. 
This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of the direct loan and subsidy 
programs.  Section 9.2 considers various methods of  determining the 
subsidy element in official export credits and presents estimates of  the 
export credit subsidies provided by the major lending countries. It esti- 
mates that the subsidy in the direct loan and subsidy programs for these 
countries ranged from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion in 1980. Of this amount, 
after export price  changes, it is  estimated that developing countries 
received between $500 million and $2.4 billion. 
This paper then analyzes the market factors that determine the sub- 
sidy’s effect on export prices and volumes and, thereby, the ultimate 
division of  the subsidy between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are 
found to receive between 50 and 100  percent of the subsidy, depending on 
the supply, demand, and market structure of the export industries receiv- 
ing subsidized credit. Section 9.3 raises a variety of  issues relevant in 
assessing the social costs and benefits to borrowers and lenders resulting 
from the subsidy and the ensuing changes in export prices and volumes. 
This paper concludes by describing the various international efforts that 
have been made to limit official export credit subsidies. 
9.2  Measuring the Subsidy on Official Export Credit Programs 
Outstanding direct and subsidized export credits of the major lending 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King- 
dom, and the United States) amounted to nearly $55 billion at the end of 
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between 7 and 8 percent, at the same time that private lenders charged 
rates between 5 and 15 percent. 
9.2.1 
Calculating the subsidy on official export credits requires first making a 
judgment about the private rate that the borrower would have paid. This 
rate will always exceed the government borrowing rate, but beyond that 
will depend on the characteristics of both the borrower and the loan. The 
subsidy element may be calculated as an annual interest differential or as 
the present value of future interest differentials over the life of the loan. 
The subsidy a borrower receives equals the difference between the 
official export credit institution’s rate and the rate charged in the private 
market for the same type of loan and borrower. Some estimates compute 
the subsidy by comparing the government borrowing rate with the official 
export credit rate. Such computations underestimate the subsidy, how- 
ever, because importers will always pay a higher interest rate on their 
loans, given currency denomination and maturity, than will the govern- 
ment of  the country issuing the currency. The reasons are, first, that 
privately granted export credit is tailored to the individual transaction-a 
retail transaction-with  a low volume and a high overhead. In contrast, 
government debt is marketed in large volumes and in standardized units 
and maturities. Second, privately granted export credit, because of  this 
individual tailoring, is harder to resell; by contrast, liquid markets exist at 
most maturities for government debt. Finally, only the government of the 
currency-issuing country can absolutely guarantee the payment of bonds 
denominated  in  its own currency because  only that  government  can 
legally create that currency at will. Since no private or foreign govern- 
ment borrower can make the same guarantee about his debt, lenders will 
always require additional compensation for this added risk. The market 
interest rate measures the cost to society of  granting export credit when 
its productive resources are fully employed (see Appendices A and B). 
The government interest rate, at  full employment, will always fall short of 
the private market rate for the same maturities, for the reasons discussed 
above. At full employment, the social cost is the difference between the 
export credit agency’s rate and the market rate. The difference between 
the export credit agency’s  rate and the government interest rate provides 
only some peripheral information relating to the budgeted cost-not  the 
social cost-of the export credit granting agency. 
Methods of  Calculating the Subsidy on Official Export Credits 
Fixed-Rate and Floating-Rate Estimates 
Borrowers can pay interest on their loans at interest rates fixed over the 
life of  the loan, or at interest rates that float above the wholesale bank 324  Heywood Fleisig/Catharine Hill 
rate. Typically, good credit risks can borrow at either rate, while riskier 
borrowers must take floating rate loans. 
This paper computes the subsidy under both  of  these assumptions 
about the riskiness of the borrower. It estimates the subsidy for borrow- 
ers who otherwise would have borrowed at fixed rates by multiplying the 
loans granted in each year by the difference between the bond rate at 
which they could have borrowed and the interest rate charged on the 
direct export credit. It derives the total subsidy on the loan portfolio by 
adding the subsidies on all loans still outstanding. It estimates the subsidy 
for borrowers who would otherwise have financed their imports with a 
floating rate loan by  multiplying the outstanding portfolio of  officially 
supported export credits by  the interest rate differential between the 
lending country’s short-term market rate and the average interest rate 
actually received on the portfolio. 
These methods produce an ex post measure of the subsidy that repre- 
sents the savings in debt service in any given year under different assump- 
tions about the alternative borrowing possibilities available to the bor- 
rowing country. The two measures of the subsidy may differ from ex ante 
expectations of  the subsidy. In the fixed-rate calculation, the savings in 
interest payments in future years are set at the time the loan is committed 
and, if  the borrower does not refinance, the expected and actual future 
interest subsidy are equal. In the floating rate case, the subsidy in any 
year will change with movements in the short-term interest rate. The 
expected subsidy and the actual subsidy will, therefore, only be equal if 
borrowers realize their expectations of  movements in the floating rate. 
The procedures followed under these two methods can be illustrated 
with the export financing activities for one year, 1980, of  the Export- 
Import Bank of  the United States (Eximbank). 
Only the best of  Eximbank’s borrowers could have borrowed at the 
U.S.  Aaa corporate bond rate. Assuming that all borrowers from Exim- 
bank could have obtained loans at the Aaa corporate bond rate results in 
the fixed-rate estimate of  the value of  the subsidy. Given detailed in- 
formation on the loans in the outstanding portfolio, the fixed-rate subsidy 
can be calculated as 
A,  = authorizations made in t still outstanding in 1980. 
rrAA  = corporate Aaa bond rate in t. 
r, = average interest rate on loans authorized in t. 
T = year during which oldest outstanding loans were authorized. 
Table 9.1  shows the amount of direct loans authorized and the weight- 
ed-average interest rate charged. The Aaa corporate bond is also shown, 325  Official Export Credit Programs 
Table 9.1  Estimation of the Eximbank Loan Subsidies 
Weighted-  New 
Average  Direct Loan  Estimated 
Interest  Authorizations  Aaa  Subsidy 
Rate on  (millions  Corporate  (millions 
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SOURCES:  Weighted-average  interest rates were supplied  by  Eximbank  staff. The Aaa 
corporate bond yield was taken from the Federal Reserve Board, Annual Statistical Digest, 
and Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
as is the amount saved annually by  Eximbank borrowers-the  subsidy. 
The total subsidy on Eximbank’s loan portfolio in any year is the sum of 
the subsidies on the debt still outstanding from earlier years. 
If  the data on the percent of  past authorizations still outstanding are 
not available, these estimates assume that all loans authorized in a given 
year have a maturity equal to the average and that tlTpercent (where T = 
average maturity and r ranges from 1  to T) of loans authorized (T  + 1 - 
t)  years in the past are still outstanding. For example, one-ninth of loans 
authorized nine years ago would still be outstanding, given T = 9. These 
estimates weight the resulting subsidy so that the weighted average of 
loan authorizations made in the past equals the total outstanding export 
credits. Using this procedure for Eximbank yields a fixed-rate estimate of 
the subsidy equal to $213.5 million for 1980. 
If  the data on past authorizations are not available, these estimates 
assume that  authorizations have  remained  constant over  time. Since 
authorizations have generally been increasing for the countries consid- 
ered, this assumption will yield a lower bound for the fixed-rate estimate. 
For example, using this procedure for Eximbank yields an estimate of the 
subsidy of  $171.2 million for 1980. 
The floating-rate comparison is appropriate in cases where the borrow- 
ers are not creditworthy enough to secure fixed-interest loans by selling 
bonds. Instead, they borrow at rates that follow the Eurocurrency rates. 
In 1980, on a portfolio of  $13.8 billion, Eximbank earned a return of 7.31 
percent. Comparable floating rate on Eurodollar loans for that year bore 326  Heywood Fleisig/Catharine Hill 
an average rate of 14.5 percent, so the subsidy was 7.19 percent on $13.8 
billion, or $992 million. The floating-rate subsidy in 1980 is calculated as 
- 
(2)  A1980(Y&30 -  6980)  * 
- 
A1980  = total outstanding official export credits in  1980. 
YE80  = Eurocurrency loan rate in 1980. 
71980 = average interest rate on total outstanding official export credits 
Computing the subsidy requires knowing the weighted-average in- 
terest rate on the entire portfolio. Sometimes the lending agency supplies 
that information, but in other cases the lending agency supplies only the 
average interest rate for each year’s authorizations. In the latter case, 
computing the average interest  rate on the entire portfolio  requires 
knowing the volume of each year’s authorizations still outstanding. When 
the lending agency does not supply that information either, we estimate 
the authorizations still outstanding, by  year, as we did for the fixed-rate 
estimate of  the subsidy (see above). 
The above estimates assume that borrowers faced, as an alternative, 
the market rate  on  loans denominated in  the same currency  as the 
subsidized  export  credit.  Recently,  countries have  begun  providing 
officially  supported export credits in foreign currencies. In such cases, the 
subsidy for any one country is the difference between the subsidized rate 
and the market rates for loans in the currencies in which the subsidized 
export credits are made. This procedure was used for the calculation of 
the subsidy for Canada, where a large proportion of  loans are denomi- 
nated in U.S. dollars. Although several other countries have started to 
provide official export credits in  foreign currencies,  inadequate  data 
prevented our taking this into account in the subsidy calculations. The 
error introduced is probably small, however, both because foreign cur- 
rency authorizations have only become important in the last few years 
and because authorizations are not immediately reflected in outstanding 
loans. 
An alternative method for calculating the subsidy would be to express 
it  as the discounted  present value of  the fixed-rate subsidy on loans 
authorized  in  any one year.  The subsidy would equal the difference 
between the face value of the subsidized loan and the present value of the 
repayment stream computed at the market rate of  interest? Computing 
the present discounted value of  the subsidy permits representing and 
analyzing the interest  subsidy in  a price-equivalent  form:  borrowers 
should be indifferent between receiving the interest subsidy and receiving 
a decrease in the price of the good equal to the present discounted value 
of the interest subsidy. However, official institutions lend only a portion 
of the purchase price of an export; since that portion differs both between 
- 
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countries and within countries among different goods, and since some 
important  countries  do not  report  these  data, computing  the price- 
equivalent subsidy still does not permit comparing its size to export prices 
or unit values. 
The present  value of  the subsidy, moreover, is difficult to compute 
because its calculation requires information on people's beliefs about the 
future course of  interest rates (for a floating-rate loan) or about their 
refinancing plans (for a fixed-rate loan). By contrast, the method pre- 
sented in section 9.2.1 avoids this problem by  calculating the interest 
subsidy for one year on all loans outstanding in that year. 
9.2.2  Empirical Findings 
Following the methods illustrated  above with U.S. data, this paper 
estimates that the total subsidy of the major lending countries amounted 
to about $1.5 billion in 1980 if  the borrower's alternative was, in actuality, 
a fixed-rate loan (see table 9.2). A negative entry in this table implies that 
a borrower took an official loan at a rate in excess of  the market bond 
rate. Since a sensible borrower would not willingly do that, negative 
entries rather indicate that the typical recipient of  official export credits, 
contrary to assumption, could not borrow at the fixed bond rate assumed 
and that the estimate of  $1.5 billion is too low. 
If the typical recipient of official export credit would have borrowed at 
floating rates in the absence of official  lending, the estimated subsidy rises 
to about $3.5 billion in 1980 (see table 9.3).  Negative subsidies, as shown 
in the table, can arise either where borrowers are unable or unwilling to 
refinance their fixed-rate official loans at lower floating rates. Borrowers 
Table 9.2  Estimate of the Subsidy When Borrowers' Alternative Is a 
Fixed-Rate Loan ($ million)a 

















































"The estimates are based on data obtained from the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States. For a detailed discussion of  the data, see appendix C. 
bThe numbers in parentheses were calculated assuming outstanding loans remained con- 
stant over the previous year. This was done when data were not available for recent years. 
Since most programs have been growing, this should provide a lower bound on the estimate 
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might be unable to refinance at the spreads assumed in table 9.3 (50 basis 
points over the three-month interbank rate in the country where the loan 
is made). In that case, table 9.3 underestimates the subsidy.’ On the other 
hand, borrowers might be unwilling to refinance longer-term fixed rate 
commitments at lower, floating short-term rates if they foresaw a pattern 
of short-term rates over the life of the longer-term loan that would make 
it unprofitable for them to refinance; it is difficult to imagine an oper- 
ational test of  this explanation. 
Lacking direct information on the regional distribution of  the subsidy 
by  type of  borrower, this paper estimates it by  assuming that lenders 
subsidize all borrowers by  approximately the same amount. Then the 
distribution of  the loans by type of borrower would be the same as the 
distribution of  the subsidy by  type of  borrower. Table 9.4 shows the 
distribution of loans by type of borrower: 69 percent of the loans went to 
developing countries, 24 percent to Eastern Europe and China, and the 
remainder to other developed countries! 
The entire subsidy is not transferred to foreign borrowers, however, 
because domestic exporters in the lending country can raise prices and 
recapture part of  the  subsidy’s benefits.  Section 9.3.1 discusses why 
recapture probably ranges between zero and one-half in most typical 
markets. Applying these recapture rates to the estimated range of  total 
subsidy granted by the export credit-$1.5-$3.5  billion-yields  an esti- 
mate of  subsidy actually transferred of  $.75-$3.5  billion. 
Assuming that the transferred subsidy is distributed by  type of  bor- 
rower  in  the same proportion  as the pattern of  lending implies that 
developing countries would have received about 70 percent of  the trans- 
ferred subsidy, or $.5-$2.4  billion. Because the Arrangement on Guide- 
Table 9.3  Estimate of the Subsidy When Borrowers’ Alternative Is a 
Floating-Rate Loan ($ million)a 
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Table 9.4  Geographic Distribution of Subsidized Export Credits 
1978  1979 






Eastern Europe and China 
Less developed countries 
Developed countries 
Eastern Europe and China 
Less developed countries 
Developed countries 
Eastern Europeb 
Less developed countries 
Developed countries 
Eastern Europe and China 





United Kingdom  Developed countries 
Eastern Europe and China 
Less developed countries 
Total 
United States  Developed countries 
Eastern Europe and China 
Less developed countries 
Total 
Total  Developed countries 
Eastern Europe and China 
Less developed countries 
Total 
19  5 
18  33 
62  63 
100  100 
7  5 
28  26 
-  - 
69 
100  100 
-  66  - 
-  - 
52  30 
70  48 
100  100 
-  - 
4  2 
26  43 
55 
100  100 
-  70  - 
13  15 
34  19 
66 
100  100 
-  53  - 
16  11 
1  2 
87 
100  100 
-  83  - 
12  7 
22  24 
69 
100  100 
-  66  - 
SOURCE:  Trends in Export Credits among Major Competitors. Export-Import Bank of the 
United States. Policy Analysis Staff. Washington,  D.C., 6 March 1981. 
"The figures for Italy only include credits with a repayment term over five years. 
bFigures for Italy do not include loans to China. 
lines for Officially Supported Export Credits (see section 9.4) permits 
lower interest rates and longer maturities for low-income countries, 70 
percent is a conservative estimate of the proportion of the subsidy going 
to developing countries. 
9.3  The Benefits and Costs of  Export Credit Subsidy Programs 
In both competitive and most monopolistic export markets, recipients 
of  subsidized export credits cannot lose while, symmetrically, providers 330  Heywood FleisigICatharine Hill 
of subsidized export credits cannot gain, so long as there are not external 
costs or benefits. This section first analyzes how the market reaction of 
export prices and volumes to the subsidy determines the final distribution 
of  the  subsidy  between  lending  country  exporters,  lending  country 
citizens who provide the subsidy, and the borrowing country importers. 
In view of the modest size of these programs relative to the output of  the 
lending countries, we have used a partial equilibrium approach for this 
analysis. The section concludes by considering a variety of external costs 
and benefits that affect the social costs and benefits arising from various 
redistributive and efficiency aspects of  the program. 
9.3.1  The Distribution of  the Subsidy between Borrowers 
and Exporters 
The distribution of  the subsidy will depend on supply, demand, and 
market organization in the markets receiving subsidized export credit. In 
a competitive market, when officially supported export credits increase 
demand for a good whose supply is totally inelastic, subsidized buyers bid 
up the price above its previous level. Since the quantity sold remains 
constant, by assumption, buyers can only be satisfied when the price has 
risen by enough to extinguish the extra demand created by the subsidy. 
The export price must rise then by the full amount of  the subsidy. The 
domestic exporting industry, therefore, recaptures the entire subsidy 
through higher prices, and the borrowing country gains nothing. If  the 
price of  the export is fixed  on world  markets,  whatever the  supply 
conditions, the entire subsidy is also transferred to the domestic export- 
ing industry. The  existence of many perfect substitutes for the subsidizing 
country’s exports means that only a slight price advantage suffices to 
capture much of  the market. Subsidy recipients will bid up the price of the 
subsidizing country’s exports by nearly the full amount of the subsidy and 
still willingly buy the same or greater amounts than before. 
If  supply is less than totally inelastic and the price of  the export is not 
given on world markets, however, some of  the subsidy must be trans- 
ferred to the borrowing country to induce them to purchase more. When 
supply curves are infinitely elastic over the range of  the subsidy, all of the 
subsidy is transferred to the borrowing country importers. 
If  the exporter in the lending country is a monopolist, some of  the 
subsidy must  be transferred  to the borrowing country importer. The 
monopolist always operates in the elastic portion of his demand curve and 
can always increase profits by expanding sales volume when his demand 
curve shifts out. 
Given available information on supply, demand, and market organiza- 
tion in the markets receiving subsidized export credit, this paper esti- 
mates that borrowers receive between 50 and 100 percent of the subsidy 
(see appendix A). In competitive markets, existing estimates of elastici- 331  Official Export Credit Programs 
ties of supply and demand (Stern, Francis, and Schumacher 1976) suggest 
that  almost  all of  the subsidy is transferred  to the borrower.  If  the 
exporters in lending countries are monopolists, this paper estimates that 
borrowers get half of  the subsidy:  though this finding rests on assumed 
values for the second derivatives of demand and marginal cost functions. 
9.3.2 
If  official export credit lending does not solve a market failure within 
the lending country, and markets are competitive, then overall efficiency 
or output cannot rise. If  the subsidy eliminates no market failure but, at 
the same time, makes borrowing country importers and lending country 
exporters better off, then it must make other citizens of lending countries 
worse off. If borrowing country importers receive any of the subsidy, as is 
likely, the lending country as a whole must lose. Depending on whether 
the price or volume of  exports rises, nonsubsidized citizens in lending 
countries bear the cost in different ways. 
In a fully employed economy, real net exports can rise only by reducing 
real domestic investment, consumption, or government expenditure (see 
appendix B for further discussion). If  the rise in net exports forces a 
decline in domestic investment projects, the lending country citizens lose 
the market rate of interest on the foregone investment: while the lending 
country government receives the lower, subsidized interest rate on the 
same quantity of exports. The loss to the lending country government and 
its nonsubsidized citizens amounts to the difference between the market 
rate and the lower subsidized rate. These lossses may, however, be partly 
offset by  terms of  trade gains that increase exporters’ profits when the 
subsidized loan increases demand. As discussed above, however, the 
lending country typically will not recover part of  this subsidy; that part 
will be transferred to the borrowing country and lost through the in- 
efficient use of  resources. 
When the economy is fully employed, but where an increase in imports 
offsets the rise in exports so that net exports remain unchanged, the net 
cost to the subsidizing country is the same as before.  Purchasers  of 
imported goods pay the higher world market interest rate to finance their 
additional imports, while their government receives the lower, subsidized 
interest rate on the additional exports it financed. As before, gains to 
exporters partly offset this loss, but the rest of the subsidy is retained by 
borrowing country importers or absorbed by  the higher  cost of  less 
efficient production. 
9.3.3 
While borrowing countries generally gain from the subsidy on export 
credits even after prices adjust, other costs, difficult to quantify, may 
offset the gain. Restrictions on the currency denomination of the export 
Distributional Effects within Lending Countries 
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credit may distort the currency denomination of the borrowing country’s 
debt and, thereby, offset part of the gain from the subsidy to the borrow- 
ing country.  The subsidy calculation may  also overstate  the gain to 
borrowing countries if  they compete in third markets against exports 
from industrialized countries that receive subsidized credit. 
Portfolio Effects 
Just as a country will choose a portfolio of international reserve curren- 
cies that, by various accounts, produces some optimal risk-return com- 
bination in the light of that country’s future consumption and investment 
plans, so a country will desire a portfolio of  international debt denomi- 
nated in different currencies that achieves the same end. 
If the borrowing country’s acceptance of  the export credit leads to 
denominating additional debt at market rates in a currency that moves 
the borrowing country away from its optimal debt portfolio, then the 
above estimate  of  the interest subsidy overestimates the gain  to the 
borrower. The gain to the borrower cannot be negative, however, since 
the subsidy expands the choices available to the borrower,  and the 
borrower need not accept the subsidized credit to purchase the export. 
Terms of Trade Effects 
The gain to borrowing countries from subsidized export credit may be 
offset if the borrowing countries also export goods to third markets which 
compete with exports from industrial countries that receive subsidies. 
When a developing country’s exports compete with goods which receive 
subsidies from industrial countries, its terms of  trade deteriorate. The 
fact that many developing countries have instituted official export credit 
programs to match industrial country subsidies suggests that these coun- 
tries  do export goods competitive  with  subsidized industrial  country 
exports. In particular,  some evidence exists that developing countries 
have become increasingly competitive at producing customized capital 
goods. 
When developing countries compete against industrial country exports 
to other developing countries that receive subsidized credit, the distribu- 
tion of the subsidy among individual developing countries changes, but 
the estimate of the transfer to all developing countries does not. Subsidies 
granted or price reductions on developing country exports to industrial 
countries could, however, reduce the estimates of the transfer presented 
here. Developing country exports competing against industrial country 
exports that receive most subsidized export credits (SITC category 7), 
however, amounted to only $14 billion in 1980, while industrial country 
export credits go primarily to developing countries. Given this, terms of 
trade  for developing  country  exports would  have  to  deteriorate  far 333  Official Export Credit Programs 
beyond those ever experienced to reverse the estimates of the flows given 
above. At most, even assuming that all developing country exports of 
such goods to industrial countries compete against goods receiving subsi- 
dized  credits,  the  subsidy estimate  would  be  reduced  by  about  25 
percent .’ 
9.3.4 
The exporter generally recaptures only part of the export credit subsidy 
through higher prices. Whether the lending country as a whole gains from 
the subsidy, therefore, depends on whether the official export credit 
solves a market failure within the lending country. A variety of externali- 
ties on which export credit subsidies could act have been advanced by 
proponents of  officially supported credits. Even where these arguments 
have merit, however, in few cases are export credit subsidies the best 
means of  achieving a given goal. 
The Effects of  Ojjicially Supported Export Credits on Employment 
Export subsidies can increase employment in export industries. How- 
ever, when the economy is already at full employment, employment in 
the subsidized export industry rises at the expense of  employment else- 
where. Since total employment cannot increase beyond full employment, 
and the resulting resource  shift may  temporarily  aggravate inflation, 
employment gains in export industries provide no net social gain for the 
subsidizing country. 
In the face of general unemployment, an export subsidy can increase 
total  employment.  However,  so  can  monetary  and  fiscal  policies. 
Moreover, as general tools to regulate the economy, monetary and fiscal 
policies may be superior to export subsidies. The export credit subsidy 
normally increases the production of  exports relative to other domesti- 
cally produced goods, increasing the relative cost of  the export goods to 
domestic consumers. Unless considerations other than a general increase 
in  employment  prompt  the use  of  subsidies, other policies-such  as 
monetary and fiscal policies-could  increase employment and output 
without  these side effects on relative prices and sectoral outputs. No 
reason exists, moreover, to believe that an export subsidy will provide a 
stronger or less inflationary stimulus to employment than other forms of 
budgetary spending or tax reductions. 
In addition, if  export credits do not vary over the business cycle, their 
beneficial effects in reducing unemployment in recessions will bear a cost 
later when they contribute to overheating the economy during booms. 
Since export credits are often committed far in advance of actual transac- 
tions and are usually extended over periods that are longer than any one 
stage of  the cycle, and since future cycles cannot be perfectly foreseen, 
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great difficulties  beset the use of export credits for stabilization purposes: 
These rigidities enhance the desirability of  alternative policies to deal 
with unemployment and inflation. 
Export subsidies could be used to support employment in chronically 
depressed industries or regions. The subsidy could serve as an alternative 
to unemployment payments if  it were clear that, in the absence of  the 
subsidy, the unemployed labor in a particular industry or region would 
not be employed elsewhere. However, pursuing such a policy for a long 
time would result in increasing losses to the country by  extending the 
period of  time during which resources were used inefficiently. 
Official Export Credits and Capital Market Imperfections 
Sometimes the absence of private market credit may indicate a market 
imperfection that prevents the gains from trade from being fully realized. 
In such a case, the government can correct the market deficiency by 
providing credit, making society’s use of  resources more efficient. 
The original impetus for the formation of the Eximbank arose in such a 
situation.  The  Eximbank  was  set  up  during  President  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt’s administration to finance trade with the Soviet Union. The 
administration viewed opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Un- 
ion as an important political objective. At the same time, it wished to 
alleviate the constricting effects that the 1930 Hawley-Smoot Tariff had 
on trade and to promote exports as a means of  increasing domestic 
employment.  Since the economy was in  a depression, these were all 
important policy objectives. The Soviet Union, unlike many other coun- 
tries, was agreeable to increasing imports at that point. 
At the same time, the private market was unlikely to finance trade with 
the Soviets. The lack of diplomatic recognition had slowed the develop- 
ment  of  commercial  ties,  and  unofficial  State  Department  policy, 
together with the Johnson Debt Default Act, operated to block loans to 
countries that had defaulted on war debts. Unlike the present situation, 
there was much evidence then to support the view that the private market 
would not  have lent  sufficiently to secure the side effects that were 
considered desirable on political and economic grounds. 
Similarly, after World War 11, when the U.S. government viewed the 
level of  private lending to Europe as insufficient to prevent economic 
difficulties and consequent political disorder that could have seriously 
compromised the NATO alliance, the Eximbank was one of  the institu- 
tions used to channel government loans to Europe. 
The absence of private market loans, however, does not prove that the 
market is imperfect. Some less-developed countries, for example, cannot 
float bonds in the bond market. Many reasons exist for this, all relating to 
the absence of the kind of creditworthiness and volume of credit demand 
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tions cannot  raise funds by  selling bonds.  Instead, they  and smaller 
partnerships and individuals must ordinarily finance their business loans 
by  borrowing from a retail bank at higher rates of  interest than bond 
issuers pay. 
Most less-developed countries raise funds by borrowing from banks in 
the Eurodollar market or in national banking markets. Their loans typi- 
cally have interest rates that float at a predetermined number of  basis 
points (hundredths of a percentage point) over a benchmark interest rate, 
such as the prime rate or the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). 
When an official export credit institution lends to such a borrower at, for 
example, a rate comparable to a lower corporate bond rate, it grants that 
country a subsidy equal to the difference between the retail rate it would 
have been charged because of  the greater risk, and the rate charged by 
the official institution. 
When  a bank  refuses credit to a foreign borrower  at market rates 
because of  the condition of  the country or of  the borrower within the 
country, then the risk attached to the loans exceeds that represented by 
the retail rates that banks typically charge these countries. The subsidy 
granted by the official institution is greater than the difference between 
the rate it charges and the market rate because it is taking a risk larger 
than the one reflected in the market rate. 
When the private sector responds to risky loans by  charging higher 
rates or by refusing to make them at all, this does not, as noted, necessar- 
ily mean that a market imperfection exists. When such imperfections are 
absent, official loans at below-market rates cannot raise total income or 
increase efficiency. Without solving a market imperfection, such prac- 
tices can only redistribute income away from nonsubsidized citizens and 
toward domestic exporters or citizens of  a borrowing country. 
Matching Foreign Subsidized Credit Programs 
If a foreign government permanently subsidizes an export product, the 
policy that would yield the largest income for another country’s citizens 
as a group would permit the foreign producer to supply the good. In this 
way, the country that does not match the foreign subsidy can earn larger 
quantities of  foreign exchange and import more goods by  reallocating 
domestic resources from the production of the foreign-subsidized good to 
the next most productive sector. The receipts from the sales of  these 
next-best  exports  will  be  only marginally lower,  and  the subsidy to 
foreigners will no longer be necessary. Although neither workers nor 
equipment can be reallocated without costs, reallocation involves a one- 
time cost whereas matching subsidies involves a permanent stream of 
costs. For that reason, the reallocation of resources may be cheaper when 
the foreign subsidy program is expected to last a long time. 
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temporary, then the lending  country  may  gain by  competing with  a 
matching subsidy. Whether a country will benefit from matching sub- 
sidies depends on whether the costs of  competing in the short run are 
outwieghed by the benefits of  not having to shift productive resources 
first out of  and then back into the affected export sector. 
Any one lending country might use subsidized export credits to bring 
pressure on other countries that refuse to curb their own subsidized 
lending through an international agreement. Whether this would pro- 
duce a benefit for any one country would depend on the cost to the 
country of  continued subsidization of  exports by other countries. 
Common views of fairness may also dictate matching foreign subsidies. 
When one government subsidizes export credits, it injures the producers 
in  other countries who  are competing directly with  those subsidized 
products in  both the foreign  and domestic markets.  Because neither 
workers nor equipment can be reallocated without cost, citizens in the 
nonsubsidizing country as a whole may temporarily  lose income and 
wealth. The workers and capital owners in the industry will typically bear 
these costs, but costs will be spread to other citizens through programs 
such as unemployment insurance. These risks are quite similar to those 
borne by other groups of  industrialists and workers who face weather 
changes, technical changes in foreign countries, demand changes, input 
price changes, and changes in local governments’ subsidies and tax ex- 
emptions. Nonetheless, when one government makes a conscious de- 
cision aimed largely  and necessarily at damaging exporters in  other 
countries,  the fellow citizens of  damaged  exporters may believe this 
commercial misfortune is more inequitable than the others described 
above. In this case, a country may be willing to sacrifice some efficiency to 
attain an outcome it sees as more equitable. The total costs of the subsidy 
must be weighed against the equity considerations. 
The Effect of  Officially Supported Export Credits 
on the Exchange Rate 
Increased  exports can produce  exchange rate appreciation. Where 
small interest rate subsidies produce a large increase in the total value of 
exports, an export credit subsidy program may result in exchange rate 
appreciation. However, where comparatively large interest rate subsidies 
fail to produce a much larger increase in exports, any appreciation may be 
quickly reversed. 
After the merchandise sale, however, the receipt of interest payments 
on the subsidized loan will fall short of  the payments on foreign loans 
made by citizens who were originally crowded out of  the national capital 
market.  This net  drain on interest payments will  reduce the current 
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the subsidized loan may produce a current account deficit and exchange 
rate depreciation that counteracts the initial trade surplus and exchange 
rate appreciation. 
The Benefits of  an Increase in Exports 
A rise in exports can reflect a socially desirable increase in productivity 
or in  savings, but  subsidizing exports does not force this relation  to 
operate in reverse. For example, exports may increase because produc- 
tivity rises in the export industries. If the exchange rate does not change, 
exporters will either supply more exports at the old price, undersell their 
competitors, or deliver a higher quality product at the same price. The 
rise in productivity would be a clear benefit to the country, with more 
output resulting from a given quantity of  inputs. However, the rise in 
exports would only reflect these gains; it would not produce them. 
Similarly, higher saving rates can increase net exports, but subsidizing 
exports need not raise total national saving. A rise in saving will reduce 
the consumption of imported goods and free up more domestic goods to 
be exported, thus increasing the current account surplus. Such an in- 
crease in the current account surplus means citizens are accumulating 
capital in foreign countries. Accumulation of  foreign assets passes on a 
larger total capital stock to future generations of citizens. Although the 
future generation’s  consumption  gain is  partly  offset by  the  current 
generation’s loss, so long as both generations fully undertake this shift, 
no external cost warrants using public policy to undo the savings decision. 
In economies at full employment, however, a subsidized rise in exports 
can occur only at the expense of some domestic activity-consumption, 
investment, or government  expenditure-or when  offset by  a corre- 
sponding rise in imports. If  imports rise to provide the goods absorbed by 
the increase in exports, then the subsidy has produced no rise in net 
exports.  If  the  subsidy does increase  net  exports at  the  expense  of 
domestic consumption or government spending, then the subsidy may 
ultimately raise the total of domestic and foreign investment. However, 
the domestic expenditure most likely to fall as a consequence of  sub- 
sidy-induced rises in borrowing rates is domestic investment. In this case, 
there will be no net increase in capital passed on to future generations, 
although future generations will  get  more  capital  located in  foreign 
countries. Citizens as a group will gain no obvious advantage from such a 
shift. 
A  Foreign Policy or National Security Role 
for Official Export Credits 
Official export credits are sometimes justified as a way of  protecting 
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transferring resources to foreign countries that need economic aid. It is 
doubtful, however, that export credit subsidies are an efficient way of 
achieving either of  these ends. 
If  a country wished to preserve an industrial activity within its borders 
on national security grounds, it could achieve that by subsidizing the 
exports of  that industry? Secondary national defense benefits may also 
accrue from having a larger pool of skilled workers in a given industry. It 
must be shown, however, that an export credit subsidy is a relatively 
inexpensive way to achieve this end. For example, if maintaining a core of 
trained technicans and a manufacturing capacity in naval nuclear generat- 
ing units is an important national defense objective, then a standing 
annual order for such devices might be cheaper than subsidizing the 
export of entire nuclear power plants, which include mostly goods and 
services that are unrelated to defense preparedness. 
Official export credits may also serve a foreign aid function. This does 
not, however, appear to have been their primary purpose. In the United 
States, for example, official export credits have been more concentrated 
in Europe than is foreign aid, and do not bear much relation  to the 
pattern of foreign aid disbursement in areas outside Europe (see table 
9.5). If  official export credits are distributed differently from other for- 
eign assistance, it is unclear how to evaluate them as effective foreign aid 
instruments. It might be that an addition to foreign aid would be voted by 
lending countries’ governments in exactly the way it is spent by official 
export credit institutions; but, on the other hand, it might not be. Official 
export credits are also an inefficient form of foreign aid since they are tied 
to the export of particular goods. As discussed above, part of the subsidy 
is  absorbed in the inefficient use of  resources,  lost to both  domestic 
citizens and foreigners alike. 
On occasion, the granting of export credits might also be valuable as a 
foreign policy device if  it enabled a government to take quicker action. 
This was the case in the United States in the past, when the Eximbank was 
set up to finance trade with the Soviet Union in the 1930s and later used to 
assist in European recovery after World War 11. 
Other Externalities 
A variety  of  other purposes for subsidized export credits could be 
advanced.  In all cases,  however,  not  only  does the  existence of  an 
externality justifying government involvement need to be proved, but the 
use of export credit subsidies rather than other policies must be shown to 
be optimal. For example, subsidized export credits might be part of  a 
successful industrial policy program. The case for adopting an industrial 
policy would first have to be made, however, and only then could the 
relative efficacy of subsidized export credit relative to other policies be 
evaluated. The different economic performances of  intensive users of Table 9.5  Distribution of  U.S. Economic Assistance and Eximbank Loans, by Region, Fiscal Years 1962-79  (percentages of annual totals) 
1962-76  1977  1978  1979 
Economic  Eximbank  Economic  Eximbank  Economic  Eximbank  Economic  Eximbank 
Assistance  Loans  Assistance  Loans  Assistance  Loans  Assistance  Loans 
Near East and 
South Asia  38.2  11.4  63.5  2.8  59.5  2.3  63.8  8.9 
Latin America  19.4  22.0  9.3  21.1  8.9  32.9  11.1  15.0 
East Asia  28.7  20.6  9.0  33.2  8.7  38.8  8.7  40.1 
Africa  10.3  5.6  11.1  19.8  13.9  19.1  14.8  16.2 
Europe  2.1  32.6  4.1  21.5  9.0  5.9  1.5  18.7 
Canada  0.0  1.8  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.3 
Total"  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Oceania  1.3  6.0  -  3.0  1.4  -  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.8  - 
SOURCE:  Agency for International Development, U.S.  Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations, and Loan 
Authorizations,  I  July 1945-30  September 1979, Washington, D.C. 
"Columns may not add to totals because of  rounding. 340  Heywood Fleisig/Catharine Hill 
official export credit-the  United Kingdom and Japan, for example- 
suggest caution in adopting easy generalities. 
9.4  International Controls of Officially Supported Export Credits 
Countries have attempted to control subsidized export credit terms 
since the 1930s. The Berne Union (the International Union of Credit and 
Investment Insurers) was formed in  1934 to provide  a forum for the 
discussion and exchange of  information among member export credit 
insurance agencies, now numbering thirty-five member agencies from 
twenty-seven  countries.  Over the years, the Berne Union has made 
nonbinding recommendations on the regulation of export credit policies. 
For example, in 1953 the member nations agreed to limit maturities to 
five years on export credit for heavy capital goods, and to three years on 
all other export credit. Beginning in the late 1960s, members increasingly 
disregarded these guidelines. 
In 1963  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Trade Committee established a Group on Export Credits and 
Credit Guarantees. The Export Credit Group, as it is known, organized 
an information exchange system in 1972, which provided for prior con- 
sultation on credit of longer than five years. At the same time, the OECD 
reached agreement on credit terms for ships and aircraft. 
Negotiations continued for a more comprehensive agreement on ex- 
port credits. On 27 October 1974 the Export Credit Group concluded an 
informal agreement which has come to be known as the “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement.”  It stipulated a minimum interest rate of  7% percent on 
credits of  over five years, and a maximum repayment period of  three 
years on credits granted to wealthy nations. 
Jurisdictional confusion slowed the negotiations in 1975,  when both the 
European Commission and the individual governments claimed the right 
to negotiate on commercial policy for European Economic Community 
(EEC) members. Because the European Court of  Justice awarded this 
authority to the European  Commission, the export credit agreement 
concluded on 1  July 1976  was enacted as a series of unilateral declarations 
by the nations involved in its negotiation rather than as a formal agree- 
ment.  These  nations-Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
United Kingdom, and the United States-agreed  to a matrix of minimum 
interest rates and maximum repayment terms for officially supported 
credit of  two years or more for three different income categories of 
recipient  nations (see table 9.6). This 1976 agreement, known as the 
“Consensus,” was accepted by thirteen additional OECD members dur- 
ing the succeeding year. 
The dispute with the European Commission was resolved by 1977, and 
on 1  April 1978  the “Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported 341  Official Export Credit Programs 
Table 9.6  Initial Consensus Minimum Interest Rates 
Category of  Repayment Term 
Country 
(per capita income)  2-5  Years  Over 5 Years 
Relatively poor 
Intermediate 
(under $1,000)  7.25  7.50 
($1  ,OOC-$3,000)  7.25  7.75 
Relatively rich 
(above $3,000)  7.75  8.00 
Export Credit” was concluded, superseding the Consensus. The mem- 
bers of  the EEC participated as a single unit. The Arrangement reiter- 
ated the conditions specified in the Consensus and continued as a volun- 
tary set of  guidelines. 
Because the Arrangement specifies the same minimum interest rates 
for credit denominated in all currencies, it permits actual credit subsidiza- 
tion to vary both over time and across countries. As market rates in- 
creased over time, the fixed minimum interest rates permitted a greater 
subsidy. The same fixed minimum rates permitted countries with high 
market interest rates to offer larger subsidies than could countries with 
low market rates. 
At the request of  participants in the OECD Arrangement, Mr. Axel 
Wallen, former chairman of the OECD Export Credit Group, examined 
alternatives to the existing Arrangement. This study (OECD 1980) dis- 
cussed two alternatives to the fixed matrix: a “uniform moving matrix” 
and a “differentiated rate system.” The uniform moving matrix would 
link the Arrangement minimum rates to a basket of market interest rates 
of  participant countries. The minimum interest rate would be identical 
for all currencies, but the level would be tied to some average of market 
rates. If market interest rates increased, therefore, the minimum rate of 
officially supported export credits would also increase, preventing the 
subsidy on officially supported export credits from automatically increas- 
ing.  As with  the existing Arrangement, however, subsidization rates 
would vary considerably from currency to currency, depending on the 
individual currency’s market interest rates relative to the Arrangement 
minima. 
The differentiated rate system would specify different minimum in- 
terest rates for each currency.  Rather than equalize nominal interest 
rates, this system would attempt to equalize interest rate subsidization. If 
minimum interest rates were defined to equal comparable market rates 
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mum rates could be specified to allow for an agreed absolute or pro- 
portional rate of  subsidization. 
Despite a great deal of pressure, principally from the United States, 
little progress has been made in reforming the Arrangement according to 
either of the alternatives suggested in the Wallen Report (OECD 1980). 
In the summer of  1980 at the Venice Summit, the United States sup- 
ported the differentiated rate system but was unable to reach agreement 
with the EEC. Instead, Arrangement signatories modestly increased the 
minimum interest  rates and stated their intention to pursue a better 
solution. 
Additional increases in the Arrangement minimum interest rates were 
negotiated in November 1981 and July 1982. The next round of negotia- 
tions was scheduled for May 1983, but because of  the recent easing of 
interest rates, a further increase in the Arrangement rates appears un- 
likely. 
The principle features of  the present Arrangement are: 
Cash payment. A minimum 15 percent cash payment is required on all 
contracts, no part of  which may be provided by the donor agency. 
Znterest rates. Recipient countries are divided into three categories- 
category 1  contains those with per capita GNP over U.S.$4,000;  category 
2 contains those with per capita GNP under $4,000 but not eligible for 
International Development Association (IDA) assistance; and category 
3 contains those eligible for IDA assistance. Minimum interest rates vary 
according to the category of  country and term of  the loan (table 9.7). 
Maturity terms. Category 3 countries must repay loans within 10 years; 
all others must repay within 8Y2  years. 
Exceptions.  The  Arrangement  exempts  agricultural  commodities, 
military equipment, commercial jet aircraft, and nuclear power plants. 




Country  2-5  Years  5-10  Years  5-8%  Years 
Category 3 
Category 2" 
(intermediate)  10.85  -  11.35 
Category 1  12.15  -  12.40 
-  (relatively poor)  10.00  10.00 
"Countries recently graduated to Category 2 (e.g., Algeria, Colombia, Malaysia, Nigeria) 
are eligible for export credit at 11.35 percent with repayment terms up to 10 years, rather 
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Partial exceptions allow extended repayment terms for satellite ground 
stations, conventional power plants, and cryogenic (liquified natural gas) 
tankers. 
Local-cost support. The Arrangement pertains to financing the foreign 
exchange cost of export goods from the lending country, not to local costs 
incurred in installing equipment in the borrowing country. The Arrange- 
ment prohibits local-cost financing in relatively rich countries, but per- 
mits local-cost insurance and guarantees. 
Mixed Credit. Export credits generally involve less than a 5 percent 
grant element. All credits with a grant element below 15 percent require 
prior notification of  other Arrangement signatories. Credits involving a 
15-25  percent grant element require prompt notification, while those 
with more than a 25 percent grant element are considered Official De- 
velopment Assistance and are exempted from notification requirements. 
Appendix A  Eflciency Losses and Income 
Redistribution Arising from Export 
Credit Subsidization 
For both competitive and most common monopolistic export markets, 
where external gains and losses are absent, a lending country cannot 
make itself better off by providing export credits at subsidized rates; nor 
can a borrowing country make itself worse off by accepting them.lo  Under 
typical supply, demand, and cost conditions, subsidizing export credit 
produces a combination of  some loss in efficiency together with redis- 
tribution of income away from citizens providing the subsidy and toward 
domestic exporters and foreign importers. These effects become extreme 
at the limit: a lending country offering exports in perfectly price-inelastic 
supply or facing perfectly price-elastic excess demand will transfer noth- 
ing to the borrowing country; on the other hand,  a lending country 
offering exports in perfectly price-elastic supply will transfer nothing to 
its home exporters from the subsidy program. 
This analysis examines equilibrium  reached in  the market  for the 
export good as prices and quantities adjust to a change in the export 
credit subsidy. We have not used a more general eqilibrium framework 
for two reasons. First, the smallness of  these programs relative to the 
economies providing the loans would make the computation of the effects 
econometrically  nonoperational.  Second, proper  expansion  to  more 
general effects would  require a major escalation in complexity, since 
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trade is balanced  and introducing instead a framework that optimizes 
over time. 
The subsidy, s,  is the present value of  the interest rate subsidy ex- 
pressed per unit of  quantity demanded. The demand curve is entirely a 
foreign demand curve, so only the export market is shown. In equilib- 
rium, the demand price and supply price will differ by the amount of the 
subsidy, so 
(Al)  Ps(Qs) = PD(QD)  +  S. 
In a competitive market, the social gain to the lending country, GL, 
from subsidizing the export credit equals the producers' surplus less the 
cost of the subsidy. For inverse supply curves whose integral is defined 
over the closed interval [0, Q*],  social gain, GL,  will be 
(A21  GL  = PsQ* -  oJQ*  Ps(Q)dQ -  sQ*. 
Totally differentiating expression (A2), the change in the gain with 
respect to the subsidy will be 
dGL  dPs  sdQ*  Q* = Q* (-  dPS -  1) -  sdQ*  -.  (A3) -  = Q* -  - -  - 
ds  ds  ds  ds  ds 
The social gain to the borrowing country, GB,  equals the consumers' 
surplus plus the subsidy. For inverse demand curves whose integral is 
defined over the closed interval [0, Q*],  the social gain, GB,  will be 
(A41  GB =  ole* Po(Q)dQ -  PsQ* + sQ*. 
Totally  differentiating expression  (A4), the  change  in  gain to the 
borrowing country with respect to the subsidy will be 
Endogenous Price, Upward-Sloping Supply Curve, 
Downward-Sloping Demand Curve 
Where prices are endogenous, the changes in the quantities of exports 
supplied equal those demanded in equilibrium, so that dQs = dQD = 
dQ*.  The change in the equilibrium quantity of exports (Q*)  with respect 
to the subsidy (s)  can be derived from (Al) and will be 
Given that Qs(Ps) = Q,(P,),  and Ps  = Po  + s, the change in the 
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-~  ~QD 
-  dPs =  apD  ,os-s  dPS  1. 
ds  aQs  ~QD  ds  (A71 
ap,  apD 
Evaluating (A3)  by  expressions (A6)  and  (A7) indicates  that  the 
leanding country cannot gain from the credit subsidy ([dGLlds]  C 0), 
while  similarly evaluating  (A5) indicates that  the borrowing country 
cannot lose from the credit subsidy ([dGBlds])  2  0). 
Endogenous Price, Horizontal Supply Curve 
= 0 in (A6) implies 
If the supply curve is horizontal (Ps[Qs]  = k),  substitution of aPslaQs 
dQ* -  >o, 
ds  ap,  -- 
while, by  assumption, 
Evaluating expression (A3) with the values shown in (A8) and (A9) 
indicates that the lender must lose ([dGLlds]  <  0), while similarly eval- 
uating expression (A5) indicates that the borrower must gain the entire 
subsidy (dGB = Q*ds). 
Endogenous Price, Vertical Supply Curve 
Since dQs = dQD when the price is endogenous, a vertical supply 
curve implies that dQs = dQD = dQ* = 0. Totally differentiating the 
inverse demand curve shown in (Al),  given that dPD = 0 because dQD = 
0, indicates that 
Evaluating expression (A3) given dQ* = 0 and dPs = ds indicates that 
the lending country on net loses nothing ([dGLlds]  = 0); rather, inelastic 
supply forces the transfer of  the subsidy from domestic taxpayers to 
domestic producers of the subsidized export product. Similarly, evaluat- 
ing expression (A5) with those values indicates that the borrowing coun- 
try gains nothing ([dGBlds]  = 0), but rather returns the entire subsidy to 
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Exogenous Price, or Horizontal Demand Curve 
If a country is a relatively small supplier in the international market, it 
can take the world market price as given. In this case, Ps  = Pw + s,  for a 




Substituting the values of  expressions (All)  and (A12) into expression 
(A3), the subsidizing country must lose because of the inefficiency result- 
ing from the increase in production ([dGLlds])  < 0). Substitution in 
(A5), however, indicates that the borrowing country does not gain be- 
cause the  export price rises by the amount necessary to absorb the subsidy 
([dGBlds]  = 0). 
Monopolist Exporter 
If  a country’s export market is monopolistic, the monopolist will set the 
market price at a level that maximizes profit. The monopolist’s total cost 
curve is assumed to be C = C(Q).  In the presence of a subsidy, the price 
charged by the monopolist will be 
(Al3)  PM= PD(Q)  +s. 
Assuming the monopolist sells only in the export market, monopolist 
profits will be 
(A14) 
If  the monopolist maximizes profits, 
= QP,v -  C(Q)  = QPD(Q>  +  SQ -  c(Q). 
The second-order condition will be 
The change in the quantity of exports (Q*)  with respect to the subsidy (s) 
can be derived by totally differentiating (A15) and will be 347  Official Export Credit Programs 
This is  greater  than zero by  the second-order  condition, expression 
(A16). From (A13) and (A17) 
--  ap, 
+ 1, 
dPM  -  aQ 
a2p,  ap,  a2c  +2---  Q- 
aQ2  aQ  aQ 
ds  (AW 
or, by the second-order condition and (aP,/aQ) < 0: 
e2p,  ap,  a2c 
ds  a2p,  +2--?  ap,  d2c 
dPM  - Q=+aQ-aQ2  <1 
(A191 
Q-  aQ2  aQ  aQ 
Note that dPM/ds  is not necessarily positive. If  the numerator in (A19) is 
greater than zero, then dPM/ds  will be negative. 
Assuming that the monopolist sells only in the foreign market, the 
social gain to the lending country, GL, will equal the producer's surplus 
less the cost of the subsidy. For monopolist cost curves whose integral is 
defined over the closed interval [0, Q*], social gain will be 
dC 
-  = MC(Q)  . 
aQ 
(A20)  GLM = PM  Q* -  oJQ* MC(  Q)dQ -  sQ* , 
Totally differentiating expression (A20), the change in the gain with 
respect to the subsidy will be 
dGLM  =  dP~  + pM-  dQ -MC(Q)-  dQ -  Q* -s-  dQ 
Q* ds  ds  ds  ds 
(A21) - 
ds 
= Q*( 2  -  I) + (pM  -  s -  MC(Q))-  dQ 
= Q*(  -  1) + (P, -  MC(Q))-.  dQ 
ds 
ds 
Using (A15), (A17), and (A18) and noting the second-order condition, 
S  < 0.  dGLM  = 
a2p,  ap,  d2C  +2---  Q-  dQ2  dQ  dQ2 
ds  (A22) 348  Heywood Fleisig/Catharine Hill 
Therefore, the lending country loses from the credit subsidy ([dGWdsj) 
The expression for the gain to the borrower  facing a monopolistic 
exporter is the same as in the competitive case (expression [A4]). Eval- 
uating the change in the gain to the borrowing country, expression (A5) 
with expression (A19) indicates that the borrowing country gains from 
the credit subsidy ([dGBlds])  > 0). 
Empirical Estimates of  the Distribution of  the 
Subsidy between Borrowers and Exporters 
In the competitive case, expression (A5) shows the gain to the bor- 
rower resulting from the subsidy. Representing the gain in relation to the 
total subsidy yields 
< 0). 
dPS  -- -1--.  dGB 
Qds  ds 
Substituting for dPslds from expression (A7) yields 
aQs 
Using Qs = QD  and assuming that Ps  = Po  before the subsidy is 
introduced, dGBlQds can be written as 
,  ~>Oandq<O,  ,  dGB-  E 
Qds  E-rl 
--- 
where  E and q are the elasticities of  supply and demand for exports, 
respectively. 
Using previously estimated  supply and  demand elasticities (Stern, 
Francis, and Schumacher  1976), dGB/Qds ranges  approximately  be- 
tween  three-quarters and one and, therefore, most of  the subsidy is 
transferred to the borrower. 
In the monopolist case, the gain to the borrower as a result of  the 
subsidy as a proportion of  the total subsidy is 
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Evaluation of  the sign or the magnitude of  this expression is impossible 
without estimates of  the second derivatives of  the demand and  cost 
curves. If  we assume the demand and marginal cost curves are linear, as 
the intermediate case between the convex and concave alternatives, then 
dGB/Qds = 1/2, and the borrower receives half of  the subsidy. 
Therefore, admittedly in the presence of  some potentially large gaps, 
present knowledge about competitive and monopolistic market structure 
of  industries receiving subsidized export credits suggests that borrowers 
receive between half and all of  the subsidy on official export credits. 
Appendix B  The Macroeconomics of  the Size and 
Distribution of  the Cost of  Export 
Credit Subsidies 
Appendix A analyzed the distribution of costs and benefits of the export 
subsidy program in a microeconomic framework. Since, at full employ- 
ment, domestic exporters and foreign importers must gain from subsi- 
dized credit, while total domestic output cannot rise, the subsidizing 
taxpayers must lose from the program. This appendix shows this outcome 
in terms of  the GNP accounts; the results are similar. 
Case 1: Export Subsidies That Result in Additional 
Export Volumes at Full Employment 
Suppose that when the export subsidy increases foreign demand for 
exports, the export price remains unchanged but the volume of exports 
rises. Rearranging the national income identity produces: 
(A28)  F- C-  I- G+  M=  x 
If the economy is at full employment, so that Y is at its maximum (Y =  v),  the rise in exports cannot occur out of additional production; instead 
consumption, investment, or government expenditure must fall, or im- 
ports must rise. 
If  the rise in exports is  achieved by  increasing imports, no change 
occurs initially in the trade balance. The lending country gains an asset- 
the export credit that bears interest at the lower, subsidized rate; at the 
same time, lending country citizens incur an identical liability to finance 
additional imports, but they pay interest at the unsubsidized world in- 
terest rate. The lending country net debt position does not change, but 
the lending country loses the difference between the subsidized and the 
unsubsidized interest rates. Exporters sell a larger volume of their prod- 
ucts, but total lending country national output remains unchanged. For- 
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country, while lending country importers pay the higher market interest 
rate and a larger total interest bill to foreigners. 
Suppose now that imports remain unchanged, so that exports and the 
trade balance increase by reducing domestic investment. At the margin, 
domestic investment earns the domestic, unsubsidized rate of interest. By 
giving up the domestic investment project, lending country investors lose 
the unsubsidized rate of  interest on the foregone domestic investment 
project now devoted to exports; in exchange, the lending country re- 
ceives the lower, subsidized rate of  interest on the rise in exports. If 
consumers require the same marginal return on a unit of  consumption 
that they require on a unit of  investment, then a rise in exports at the 
expense of domestic consumption produces the same net loss for society. 
If  the government requires the same marginal return on government 
expenditure that its private citizens receive on private investment, then a 
rise in exports at the expense of  government expenditure produces the 
same net loss for society. 
Case 2: Export Credit Subsidies That Increase Export Values 
and Unit Values but Leave Export Volumes Unchanged 
If  the volume of  exports does not change, export promotion incurs no 
real cost to the economy as a whole. The preceding discussion rests on the 
assumption that there is such a real cost, and that it is borne by investors, 
consumers, or the government. This section establishes that, even in the 
absence of  such a real cost, the loss to the nonsubsidized sector will 
exactly equal the gain to the subsidized sector. 
With constant real exports, resulting from a vertical export supply 
curve, the export price (Px)  will rise by the change in the present value of 
the interest subsidy per unit of  sales (appendix A, expression A10): 
dPx = ds . 
Assume,  for  simplicity, that  there  are two  types of  goods-those 
produced for home consumption, H,  and those produced for export, X. 
The geometrically weighted GNP deflator would then be 
(A30)  Py  = PHaPgPa). 
Assume now that the central bank pursues credit policies that prevent 
the GNP deflator from rising despite the credit subsidy’s initiaI upward 
impact on export prices, so that the rate of  change of  the GNP deflator is 
P*  = aPH + (1 -  .)P,  = 0. 
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The change in that value as a result of  the subsidy is 
The real value of products produced for home consumption measured 
in terms of  GNP is 
and this will fall by the same amount as the rise in the real value of exports 
Appendix C Data on OfJicial Export Credits 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of  the OECD col- 
lects information on transfers of long-term financial resources from DAC 
member countries to developing countries. DAC reports data for offi- 
cially supported export credits comprising directly extended official ex- 
port credits and officially insured or guaranteed private export credits. 
Guaranteed private export credits, in turn, include financial credits and 
supplier credits. Supplier credits are private export credits extended by 
an exporter. Financial credits refer to credits by a bank or other financial 
institution extended to a foreign buyer. Included under guaranteed pri- 
vate export credits are  credits on which an export creditor receives official 
support, including discounting of an export credit at preferential terms by 
an official agency or  provision of a subsidy to an export creditor to reduce 
the interest rate charged by him to the borrower. 
Data reporting procedures raise problems in calculating the subsidy. 
When official support for export credits takes forms other than direct 
credits (e.g., the United Kingdom’s interest make-up scheme or France’s 
rediscounting facilities), program activities show up in data for guaran- 
teed private export credits. As a result, while OECD  data permit deriving 
figures on total officially supported export credits, they do not permit 
isolating those programs equivalent to the direct loan program of  the 
U.S. Eximbank. 
The OECD Trade Committee’s Group on Export Credits and Credit 
Guarantees  also collects data on officially supported  export credits. 
These data do not, however, differentiate among types of systems used to 
support export credits and, therefore, do not permit breaking out the 
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World Bank 
Under the Debtor Reporting System (DRS), the World Bank collects 
information on the external debt of  developing economies that have 
received either World Bank or International Development Association 
(IDA) loans. Countries report changes in their long-term external public 
and publicly guaranteed debt to the DRS. For the World Debt Tables, 
several other sources supplement these  data, including the OECD’s 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the World Bank’s Capital Markets 
System (CMS). Available data on private debt without public guarantees 
are also included.  The data are broken down by  official and private 
creditors. Officially extended buyer export credits can be identified for 
the United States, Germany, Japan, and Canada. As with the OECD 
data, however, credits receiving support through refinancing at preferen- 
tial rates or interest rate make-up schemes are included in private-source 
loans and cannot be distinguished from other private credits. 
Berne Union 
The Berne Union (the International Union of  Credit and Investment 
Insurers) collects data on export credit insurance and guarantees issued 
by thirty-five export credit and insurance agencies from twenty-seven 
countries. 
Berne Union data cover commitments and offers. Commitments are 
export credits for which insurance or guarantees have been issued by 
Berne Union member agencies. They are reported on an outstanding 
basis, net of  repayments, and include undisbursed amounts. Commit- 
ments are broken into short-term credits and payments due on an annual 
basis.  Offers, reported separately, are potential export credits which 
have not yet reached the contract stage and for which insurance and 
guarantees have not been issued. The Berne Union presents data orga- 
nized by recipient country and by Berne Union member agency, updated 
on a quarterly basis. 
Commitments include supplier credits extended directly by  the ex- 
porter (which are said to be “insured”) and buyer credits or financial 
credits extended by private banks (which are said to be “guaranteed”). 
Commitments also include export credits extended directly by two mem- 
ber agencies, the U.S. Eximbank and Canada’s Export Development 
Corporation (EDC). Berne Union data also indirectly include official 
export credit support supplied by the remaining five countries discussed 
in the paper (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), 
since each country requires insurance or guarantees for official support. 
The Berne Union data as reported cannot, however, be used to calculate 
the subsidy element on direct official export credits; although they in- 
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which insurance and guarantees have been issued by Berne Union mem- 
ber agencies. 
Export-Import Bank of  the United States 
The Export-Import Bank of  the United States submits a semiannual 
report to Congress on competition in the provision of officially supported 
export credit and financing (Report to the U.  S. Congress on Export Credit 
Competition and  the Export-Import Bank  of the  United States). Until 
recently, data on official export credit financing programs were reported 
for the seven countries considered in this paper.  Financing programs 
include both direct credits, such as those extended by the U.S. Eximbank 
and Canada’s EDC, and refinancing facilities and interest rate subsidy 
programs (programs comparable to direct export credits). 
Notes 
1. The export credit programs of these countries are discussed in detail in Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (1982) and Midland Bank (1980). 
2.  Boyd (1982) defines the  subsidy in this way, and Feinberg (1982) reviews three studies 
that use this concept of  the subsidy. 
3.  A 50-basis point spread probably underestimates  the cost of  export credit, particu- 
larly to developing countries. If  the spread is increased to 200 basis points, the estimate of 
the subsidy increases from $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion, and most of  the entries in the table 
turn positive. 
We might calculate the subsidy more accurately by using available data on the actual risk 
premiums  that borrowers receiving  official subsidized  export credit pay in the private 
market. If  most borrowers pay a higher spread than we have assumed, or  if some borrowers 
receiving subsidized export credits are not creditworthy enough to borrow in the private 
market, then we have underestimated the actual subsidy. 
4. Currently we do not have data on the geographic distribution of direct and  subsidized 
loan programs. We assumed, therefore, that such programs were distributed geographically 
in the same pattern  as the sum of  direct and subsidized  loan programs  and guarantee 
programs. In addition, no information  was available on the geographic distribution  of 
Canadian official export credits. We assumed, therefore, that it equaled the average of the 
other lending countries. 
5. See appendix A for an analysis of  the competitive and monopolistic situations. 
6.  If  private citizens and the government choose additional consumption and investment 
expenditures so that the returns on those expenditures equaled those on additional invest- 
ment projects, the cost of  additional exports to society would be the same whether invest- 
ment, consumption, or government expenditure is displaced. 
7.  We thank Helen Hughes for bringing this point to our attention and Ernst Lutz for 
providing the trade data. 
8. In the United States, the evidence suggests that export credits have not been used 
countercyclically. Instead, direct loan authorizations have been high when unemployment 
has been low. 354  Heywood Fleisig/Catharine Hill 
9.  Aircraft producers receive one of  the largest shares of  official export lending. Military 
considerations do not generally govern such loans, though. Subsidized loans are made for 
civilian  aircraft  that are generally  not  used  by  the military.  In the United States, for 
example, most military airframes are made by other companies, and when the government 
finance sales of those planes, it does so with loans from other programs. Indeed, Appendix 
11, section 5 of  the Export-Import Bank Act of  1945, as amended through 10 November 
1978, states that the “Bank shall not extend loans, guarantees, or insurance under this Act in 
connection with the sale of  defense articles or defense services.” 
10. In several special cases paying an export subsidy, as compared to levying a tariff or 
doing nothing, may increase domestic welfare. When domestic product markets are imper- 
fectly competitive,  and producers sell in both the home and foreign markets, an export 
subsidy rather than a tariff  may increase domestic welfare. For example, if  a domestic 
monopolist has a decreasing marginal cost curve, an export subsidy will lead to increased 
output and lower average costs. If  the monopolist can discriminate between the domestic 
and foreign markets, the falling marginal cost of  total output will lead the monopolist to 
reduce prices in the domestic market and increase the welfare of domestic consumers. The 
optimal export subsidy will balance the cost of  the subsidy against the increased consumer 
surplus. Even if  the monopolist cannot discriminate between the two markets, an export 
subsidy may increase welfare under certain elasticities of demand in the home and foreign 
markets (Auquier and Caves 1979). 
These results do raise the possibility that policymakers, in structuring an export credit 
subsidy program, could identify industries with increasing returns or could base subsidies on 
different home and foreign demand conditions. 
However, two serious problems greatly weaken this case for export subsidization: first, 
the argument artifically restricts policymakers’ choices, thereby neglecting the even supe- 
rior welfare outcome that the subsidizing government could achieve by simply regulating 
the home monopolist’s  home market price; and second, the rise in the monopolist’s real 
output that contributes to the  rise in home welfare must, under full employment, incur costs 
that reduce other output whose loss is not accounted for in the calculation. 
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Comment  Rachel McCulloch 
With export performance in general and the role of  subsidized export 
credit in particular currently subjects of intense policy debate, a thorough 
reexamination of  the rationale for and likely effects of  export credit 
programs is indeed timely. Fleisig and Hill, in evaluating the costs and 
benefits of these programs, stress several important points often obscured 
or neglected in policy discussions. 
The first, a major theme of  the paper, concerns the cost of  direct loan 
and subsidy programs.  As the authors indicate, the appropriate cost 
measure reflects the difference between actual credit terms obtained and 
the best terms otherwise available to a given borrower.’ While actual 
terms are usually a matter of  public record, the alternative must be 
inferred from market rates at the time the loan was made, a process that 
in turn requires an ex post assessment of the borrower’s creditworthiness 
at that time. 
To estimate the subsidy element in credit obtained through the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) and similar agencies of six 
other industrialized nations, Fleisig and Hill use two proxies for borrow- 
ers’ market alternatives. The first is the Aaa corporate bond yield, the 
rate available to the best corporate borrowers. This is used to generate a 
lower limit of  the amount of  the subsidy. Less creditworthy borrowers 
would be unable to secure such loans, however. Instead, they would have 
to borrow  at floating rates determined in  the Eurocurrency market. 
Eurocurrency rates are therefore used to estimate an upper limit of  the 
amount of  the subsidy. In both cases, the authors calculate the total 
subsidy in a given year for all loans outstanding in that year. Because new 
loan authorizations have been increasing over time, this procedure yields 
a figure less than the value of the current subsidy to exports implied by the 
programs. 
In several instances, the subsidy calculated by this method is negative, 
that is, the actual rate was above the hypothetical market alternative. As 
the authors note, such negative values probably mean that, contrary to 
assumption, recipients of official export credits could not borrow at the 
rate assumed. In such cases, however, the estimated subsidy should be set 
at zero. This would yield higher values for both the lower and upper limits 
than those reported in the paper. 
A second major theme of  the paper is the potential benefit to the 
exporting country from subsidized export credit (most of the same argu- 
ments would apply also to a wide range of  other export incentives). 
Fleisig and Hill strongly question the common justifications of  export 
credit programs on efficiency grounds. In the absence of market failure, 
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efficiency is necessarily reduced by such programs, while the presence of 
market failure neither ensures that intervention will improve the situa- 
tion nor that export credit subsidization is the most efficient type of 
intervention. 
As the authors note, when resources are fully employed any increase in 
exports must entail increased imports or reduced domestic absorption. 
Another possibility, not explored by the authors, is that the effect on total 
exports is minor. If  other nations offer similar terms, it is unlikely that 
subsidized credit has an important effect on total exports even for the 
industries directly affected, and it is quite possible that any increase for 
these industries is offset by reduced sales for the nation’s other exporters. 
Even when resources are idle, a case for subsidized export credit on 
macroeconomic grounds is weak. Fleisig and Hill note that monetary and 
fiscal  stimulus could achieve the same effect without distorting the alloca- 
tion of  resources between industries. More important but never men- 
tioned is that, like import restrictions, successful  export incentives merely 
shift employment in beggar-your-neighbor fashion to other nations com- 
peting in the same foreign markets. Arguments for subsidized export 
credit  to maintain  the viability of  a  domestic  industry  are  similarly 
second-best? If  a given production level is required (e.g., for national 
security reasons), a direct production subsidy is the most efficient way of 
ensuring this. 
With respect to the distributive impact of subsidized export credit, the 
authors seem to be on firm ground in asserting that exporters and foreign 
borrowers typically share the gain; the precise division depends on condi- 
tions of supply and demand. Fleisig and Hill work out the details for two 
cases, perfect competition and simple monopoly. Here the analysis seems 
curiously devoid of institutional content, especially in a paper prepared 
for a conference on U.S. trade policies. Surely it is relevant that the lion’s 
share of U.S. export credit supports the sales efforts of just a tiny number 
of  large oligopolistic firms. In 1980, loans supporting sales of  aircraft 
alone accounted for nearly one-half the total, with the successful U.S. 
exporter usually facing at most two rival suppliers worldwide. Apart from 
aircraft, the purchases most frequently financed through Eximbank are of 
major capital equipment, including such specially tailored items as turn- 
key industrial facilities, nuclear power plants, and communications satel- 
lites. On the demand side, purchasers obtaining credit are almost always 
national governments or enterprise5 owned by them. 
Thus, at least for U.S. export credit programs, the model of  perfect 
competition is largely irrelevant. Sellers are monopolists or oligopolists, 
and since the nature of  the products facilitates price discrimination, 
Fleisig and Hill’s assertion that the buyer necessarily shares in the ben- 
efits need not hold. On the other hand, these buyers are hardly likely to 
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to both parties. Unfortunately, the potential for corruption is obviously 
present; there is a clear danger that any benefits to the importing nation 
will be captured by government officials responsible for awarding the 
contract? 
The authors’ discussion of costs and benefits focuses exclusively on the 
exporting and importing nations. Yet, as already indicated, this is in- 
appropriate. If  competing exporters do nothing in response, their share 
of lucrative export markets will be invaded. More typically, all suppliers 
offer comparable credit terms. In fact, the Eximbank justifies its opera- 
tions as merely allowing U.S.  exporters-in  selected industries-to  com- 
pete on “equal” terms with their foreign rivals. Obviously the effect on 
total exports from all suppliers is likely to be small, which explains the 
ongoing efforts, described by  Fleisig and Hill without comment as to 
motivation,  to negotiate  international  controls  on this type  of  trade 
intervention. 
Notes 
1. As the authors’ analysis implies, neither the profits and losses of the credit agency nor 
the delinquency  and default  experience  on loans is directly  relevant  in calculating  the 
amount of the subsidy. Until recently, Eximbank operations yielded a positive net income, 
and its annual report highlighted dividends paid by the agency to  the U.S. Treasury. This net 
income was generated by borrowing at essentially government rates and relending at higher 
ones still well below the market alternative available to borrowers. Such “profits” are not a 
measure of  national benefit or cost of Eximbank activities, but only of budgetary impact. 
2.  The FY  1980 report of  the Eximbank indicates continued support for the “essential 
aircraft sector” and explains that although this financing absorbs a “substantial portion of 
the Bank’s resources,  official support is necessary  to ensure that U.S.  manufacturers 
maintain their competitive position in export markets.” 
3.  Recognizing the extent to which sales of  aircraft dominate the Eximbank credit totals 
leads to still other questions concerning ultimate gains and losses. Even if the actual cost per 
plane is lower to the purchaser  than in the absence of  such programs,  are developing 
countries well served by incentives to expand the operations of their money-losing national 
airlines? And what of  U.S. commercial airlines, which must compete on some international 
routes with foreign carriers benefiting from Eximbank credit subsidies? 